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The purpose of this paper is to show that efficient corporate control can
be maintained in the absence of large shareholders, provided that there exist
active arbitragers in a properly functioning financial market. To illustrate the
point, the focus is on the contest for corporate control, in which arbitragers,
who buy large amounts of shares after a takeover announcement, become tem-
porary large shareholders of the firm. It is shown that the presence of these
temporary large shareholders makes otherwise impossible takeovers successful.
The model also explains a range of widely observed phenomena in the con-
test for corporate control, including the relationship between jumps in share
price and those in trading volume. The optimal takeover premium is shown
to be a fixed portion of the value improvement which the takeover can realize.
This division rule implies that the market for corporate control can be efficient,
thanks to the participation of arbitragers. The importance of financial markets
and arbitragers for corporate control is emphasized in the context of large scale
privatization.
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A tenet of the modern theory of ownership and property rights states that a firm
owned by millions of small shareholders is bound to be inefficient, since each owner
would rely on other owners to monitor the operation of the firm and in the end no
one would exercise his/her control right. A well-known study is Grossman and Hart
(1980). They argue that it is difficult to replace a widely recognized bad management
of a publicly held firm, because all small shareholders would not sell their shares
to the corporate raider in order to benefit from the potential share value increase2.
Therefore, large shareholders are necessary to maintain effective corporate control, as
was argued by Shleifer and Vishny(1986).
In this paper, I will argue that the aforementioned conventional wisdom is not
always correct. Specifically, I will show that effective corporate control can be main-
tained in spite of diffused ownership, provided that there exists a properly functioning
financial market with active arbitragers. To illustrate this point, the focus is on the
contest for corporate control. After a takeover announcement, arbitragers take po-
sitions in the stock of the firm by buying large amounts of shares in the hope of
making profits. Once in position, they become temporary large shareholders. Unlike
small shareholders, they tend to sell their shares to the raider, since their decision to
sell to the raider is crucial to the success of the takeover. Through this mechanism,
profitable takeovers become possible and incompetent management can be replaced.
Therefore, to a great extent, an efficient financial market with active arbitragers fills
the vacuum of corporate control left by diffused owners.
Another aim of this paper is to explain certain empirical patterns in the highly
dramatic contest for corporate control. A widely observed phenomenon is that, after
"Unless the price of the tender offer is as high as the improved value of the firm, but then no
value-improving takeovers win ever be attempted, since the takeover process is not costless for the
raider. This is because each shareholder is too small to be individually influential in the outcome of
the takeover.
the announcement of the takeover, both the stock price and the transaction volume
rise tremendously relative to their pre-announcement levels. Jensen and Ruback
(1983) found in a comprehensive survey that the average jump in share price ranges
from 17% to 35%3. Moreover, numerous case studies revealed that the increased
trading volume is largely due to arbitraging activities
4. Why is there such a great
jump in the price of the shares? Why do the arbitragers participate to such a great
extent during a takeover? What is the effect of their participation on the outcome
of the takeover fight? Given the existence of these arbitragers, how does the raider
choose his optimal takeover strategy?
In a two period model, a firm is initially owned by a large number of atomistic
small shareholders. At the beginning of period one, a takeover bid is announced by
a raider. The bidding price is chosen to maximize the raider's expected takeover
surplus. Then the trading of the stock of the firm takes place. Arbitragers place
orders for shares among small investors whose demand is given exogenously. The
market clearing price incorporates the (incumbent) small shareholders' expectation
'They reported that the "abnormal return to target firms of successful tender offers in the month
or two surrounding the offer ... ranges from 16.9% to 34.1% and the weighted average ... is 29.1%
". They also found that, for unsuccessful tender offers, the weighted average is 35.2%. It should be
pointed out that these estimates came from samples that covered periods before the merger wave of
the 1980's. It is suspected that if the same estimation procedures were repeated with the samples
from the 1980's, significantly larger statistics would be reported.
'See Harvard Business School case 9-282-065: Note on Hostile Takeover Bid Defense Strategies,
which was originally prepared by Merrill Lynch White Weld Capital Market Group. For specific
examples see Harvard Business School (HBS) case 9-285-053: Gulf Oil Corp-Takeover , HBS case
9-285-018: The Diamond Shamrock Tender for Natomas (A) and D. Commons: Tender Offer, which
is a description by the ex-CEO of Natomas. On the other hand, it is common knowledge among
financial arbitragers that a takeover bid represents one of the best opportunities for them to operate.
Not of the least importance is the book by Ivan Boesky, the king of arbitragers in 
the U.S. in the
1980's, Merger Mania - Arbitrage: Walt Street's Best Kept Money-making Secret. 
In this book, it
is clear that trading in takeovers is a major activity of the arbitrager.
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of the success rate of the takeover. This expectation is based on their forecast of
the outcome of the game in the next period. In the second period when the trading
session is closed, a tendering game is played. In this game, each arbitrager decides how
many shares to tender to the raider, while all the other small shareholders keep their
shares. An equilibrium of this tendering game generates the probability of success of
the takeover. An equilibrium of the whole model determines the post-announcement
trading price, the trading volume and the success rate of the takeover.
A major implication of this paper is for the privatization movement in the post-
socialist transition. The privatization process is likely to generate a very diffused
ownership structure for the firm, since the income distribution is very even in these
economies. The conclusions in the paper suggests that financial markets and active
arbitragers will be perhaps more important in these countries than in established
market economies. One can imagine that in these countries, once the few wealthy
investors become arbitragers, by moving from one firm to another rather than by
staying in one firm, these investors can help monitor more firms and enhance their
efficiency.
The analysis based on the model gives answers to the opening questions. The
jump in share price is explained by the rational expectation that the takeover can
be successful, even though the bidding price is below the improved value of the firm.
The very participation of the arbitrager makes such otherwise impossible takeovers
profitable for the raider.
The analysis in this paper also generates a sequence of practically observable
and/or empirically testable conclusions. It is shown that the higher the bidding
price, the higher the success rate of the takeover and consequently the higher the
trading price. Also, in most cases, the higher the transaction volume, the higher the
success rate and the trading price. Furthermore, it is found that a raider who can
greatly improve the value of the target firm would offer a high bid. In fact, the tender
offer premium is always a fixed portion of the value improvement. Thus, the market
of corporate control seems to be efficient from the shareholder's point of view.
Intuitively, the reason why financial arbitragers can be helpful to the raider in the
takeover is simple. After taking positions in the stock of the firm, the arbitragers are
much more willing than the small shareholders to tender their shares to the raider.
This is because the arbitragers are now large shareholders. For them, the decision of
whether or not to tender significantly influences the success of the takeover. In other
words, the arbitragers are very likely to be pivotal to the success of the takeover
5.
But if it is common knowledge that the participation of the arbitragers may make
the takeover bid successful, why would small shareholders trade with the arbitragers?
In other words, why doesn't a small shareholder just hold on to his shares and wait
for the success of the takeover? Or, to ask the same question from a different angle,
how can the arbitrager afford to pay a price which is high enough to persuade small
shareholders to give up their shares? It seems that the free rider problem changes
from no tendering to the raider to no trade with the arbitragers. Here is an example to
clarify this point. Assume that there are 100 thousand (100k) shares outstanding and
that the share price is $10 if the takeover fails and $20 if the takeover is a success. $18
is the tender offer. Suppose that after the takeover announcement, there is a total
demand from the small investors and arbitragers for 60k shares of the firm. Also
assume that from their a priori knowledge, small shareholders infer that out of this
demand of 60k, the probability that at least 50k comes from the arbitragers is 0.5.
Supposing that all arbitragers later tender their acquired shares, the probability of
the success of the takeover will be 0.5. Therefore, in order for the small shareholders
to give up their shares, the trading price must be as high as 0.5 x 10 + 0.5 x 20 = 15.
'In addition, these arbitragers usually have high discount rates (because they are highly lever-
aged); free riding can be costly since, in general, it takes more time for an arbitrager to benefit from
the value improvement which the raider brings. Of course, the hidden assumption is that even if the
market evaluation of the captured firm goes up instantly after the consummation of the takeover,
the arbitrager may not be able to benefit from this price jump quickly since an instant sale of shares
by the arbitrager may be interpreted as information-related and drives down the price.
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Suppose that $15 is the actual trading price, what is the profit of an arbitrager? If
the takeover is indeed successful, he earns 18 - 15 = 3 (per share)"6 ; if the takeover
fails, he gets 10 -15 = -5. Clearly, the arbitrager's expected profit is -$1. Therefore,
at the outset there should be no trade.
The reason why there exists heavy trade between the arbitragers and small share-
holders is that there is a natural information asymmetry between the arbitragers
and small shareholders. As a result, the arbitragers' evaluation of the stock is always
higher than that of the small shareholders
7
. An arbitrager who places an order for the
shares at least knows that there is a minimum of one arbitrager in play - himself
5
.
On the other hand, small shareholders cannot be sure of this. Thus, the arbitrager's
estimate of the total number of arbitragers in play should always be larger than that
of a small shareholder. In other words, that the arbitrager is more optimistic about
the success of the takeover.
The model of this paper can be adapted to explain the pre-announcement trade
of the stock. Very often, before the actual announcement of a takeover, the share
price and trading volume of the target firm already start to increase, because some
speculators who possess private information about the chance of the announcement
start to take positions. Being potentially large shareholders and trading among small
'If the arbitragers' demand actually constitutes more than 50k of the demand, then each of them
can retain some shares to later benefit from the $20 price. However, since the tender price is only
18 < 20, the average profit per share can never be over 20-15 = 5. This guarantees that arbitragers
will lose money for sore.
'Tihere is another possible basis for trade. If the arbitragers are less risk averse than small
shareholders, then the arbitragers' evaluation of the stock is again higher than that of the small
shareholders. In other words, there is a risk-bearing mechanism in such trading. This may be a
plausible scenario, since the arbitragers, unlike other investors, are known for their willingness to
take risks. In fact, in the context of takeovers, they are called risk arbitragers. Although this
consideration will strengthen the logic in the model, it is not necessary.OIt is very plausible that the arbitrager knows much more than this. In other words, the infor-
mation asymmetry is much greater than it is argued here. Thus, the explanation can be reinforced.
investors, the speculators play a very similar role to that of arbitragers in the takeover.
Kyle and Vila (1991) created a model in which there is a single speculator who
happens to be the potential raider. This speculator/raider manipulates the stock price
by his pre-announcement trading. After the trading, he has an option to announce
the takeover bid. The crucial difference between their model and a natural extension
of the current model is that in the former the raider is the sole speculator who
dominates the market. This set-up may not be realistic because the speculators and
the raiders are usually different kinds of players in the financial market. In addition,
even though a raider would like to trade before the announcement, he can only do so
to a limited extent due to financial disclosure requirements
9 . Thus, the raider cannot
easily become a dominant player in the market.
Finally, both Holmstrom and Nalebuff (1990) and Bagnoli and Lipman (1988) are
concerned with simple tender offer games. Both papers assumed that the total number
of shareholders is finite or that not all shareholders are atomistic. Their models and
conclusions are similar to certain cases of the tendering game of the current model;
i.e., when the total number of arbitragers is perfectly known'*.
Following the introduction, the model is described in detail. Next, section 3
studies the decisions of the arbitragers and the determination of the success rate of
the takeover. Section 4 is a discussion about the rational behavior of the raider -
such a raider should take the market reaction to his bid into account. Finally, the
conclusion summarizes the results of the paper and discusses the implications of these
It is felt that these financial disclosure requirements are necessary in order for the stock market
to function properly. In other words, they can be justified in a context greater than that of takeovers.
10
0f course, this case will not arise in this paper. In the current model, if the total number of
arbitragers is known ex ante , there would be no trade after the announcement of the takeover.
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results for the issue of privatization in the post-socialist transition.
2. The Model
Let S refer to the small shareholder, where the word "small" has the following
connotation: a small shareholder controls so few shares that he believes that his
decision to sell, to retain or to tender his shares will have no effect on either the
trading price or the outcome of the takeover. Let R denote the raider and A the
arbitrager. To begin with, S controls 100% of the outstanding shares. Po is the initial
price per share (before the takeover announcement).
The above set-up is exactly the same as that of the model in Grossman and Hart
(1980), except for the existence of the arbitrager. In order to accentuate the role of
the arbitrager, the current model does not consider situations where there are large
shareholders and/or the raider is initially a large shareholder. In such cases, the
takeover is much easier and profitable for the raider than in the current set-up.
The timing of the model is the following. At time 0, R announces a cash tender
offer of PT for all shares, conditional on the outcome that more than 50% shares are
tendered. If more than 50% shares are tendered, R purchases them all at the price
Pr. At time 1, stock trading takes place - A's take positions, hidden among small
investors. Finally, at time 2, a tendering game is played. In this game, all sharehold-
ers decide how many shares are to be tendered to the raider and consequently, the
outcome of the takeover bid is determined.
Assume that both Po and PT are readily observable to all. So is the value im-
provement per share that R can bring to the firm, AP. Naturally, assume
Po + AP > PT> P0
That is, the bidding price is between the status quo share price and the potential
improved value of the share. This implies that the takeover bid, if successful, is
profitable to the raider.
In addition, assume that if the takeover bid proves to be a failure, the stock price
of the firm goes back to Po". The implied assumption is that the occurrence of this
takeover bid does not change the probability of new takeover bids and their success.
The price P0 should already accommodate such information.
All of R, S and A are assumed to be risk neutral. For the raider, this is purely a
technical convenience. For S and A, this is a technical simplification of the assumption
that they share the same attitude towards risk'
2. All of them maximize expected-
utility.
The arbitragers are assumed to be homogeneous in their positions'-. That is,
should an arbitrager decide to arbitrage in the stock of the target firm, he buys a
portion, 8, of the total outstanding shares of the firm. 6 is exogenously fixed at a
constant value". The justifications are two-fold. On the one hand, there is an upper
limit on the number of shares an arbitrager can purchase. This is due to financial
disclosure requirements, such as the 13-D schedule filing in the U.S.. Obtaining
more shares than a results in significantly higher transaction costs (such as the loss
of speed and flexibility in the disposition of shares). On the other hand, most of
the costs associated with arbitraging in the takeover are likely to be fixed cost (like
research and seeking bank finance); so that once an arbitrager decides to participate,
it pays to place an order as large as is legally convenient.
Let n be the total number of arbitragers who have acquired shares of the firm.
n is assumed to be a random variable, which is exogenously given. The rationale
for this key assumption is that although the total number of arbitragers in the stock
market is known to all, when the announcement of the takeover bid is made, some
11
If the stock price falls to a different value than P, a similar analysis can still be performed.
"As the previous footnote indicates, this assumption can be relaxed so that A is no more risk
averse than S.
"Alternatively, the arbitragers are of different sizes whose distributions are common knowledge.
A model with this assumption should not change the major conclusions derived later.
41n the U.S., 5% would be a good estimate of S.
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of the arbitragers are engaged in other arbitraging operations. As a result, their
financial resources, including their bounded debt capacity, is tied up. Due to the
highly secretive nature of the arbitraging business, no one knows exactly how many
arbitragers are financially liquid.
It is common knowledge that n follows a distribution g(.). For technical tractabil-
ity, n will be treated as a real (continuous) number and, likewise, g(.) as a continuous
function. There are conceptual justifications for doing so. Appendix I is devoted to
a discussion of this issue.
Together with the arbitragers in placing their orders are the small traders, who
exist due to external reasons (such as diversification of their investment portfolio)1.
These small investors do not have access to accurate and timely information about
the firm and the stock market. However, knowing that the market is efficient, they
are sure that buying at the market price will not incur losses. As a consequence,
aggregate demand from the small traders, w, is random and independent of both the
share price and the demand of arbitragers. w is measured in terms of percentage of
the total outstanding shares of the firm. It is common knowledge that w follows a
distribution with the density function of f(.), which is independent of g(.).
Let y be the total demand for the shares of the firm, then
y = w 4. nS
As technical assumptions, both f(.) and g(.) are concave. Since both n and W are
bounded within certain ranges, the above concavity assumption essentially implies
the requirement that the distributions are single-peaked and thick-tailed. Also, as
will be justified, h(t) = 9(t)f(z - at) is assumed to be concave for all z. Of course,
h(.) is the probability density of the event: "n = t and y = z"; h(.) will appear in
numerous calculations in the model. Formally, here are the assumptions.
1
sAlso these small investors can be program or package traders whose decision to buy is based on
information uncorrelated to the takeover process.
Assumption 1 A) g : [0, j] -+ R+, g"(n) < 0 for all n;
B) f : [0,1]-4R+, f"(w) <0 for all w.
Assumption 2 Define h(t) = g(t)f(z - St) : [0, a] - R+, then h"(t) < 0 Vt.
Notice that since h"(t) = g"(t)f(z - 6t) + 29(t)f"(z - St) - 26g'(t)f'(z - 6t),
assumption 2 is almost guaranteed by its predecessors, when b is small and g'f' is
bounded from below. In reality, a is indeed small.
Following Kyle(1985), the trading process of the stock is as follows. First, arbi-
tragers and small traders simultaneously place their orders to a market maker. The
market maker, or auctioneer, sets the market price which equilibrates the supply and
demand15 .
The market of the stock must be a competitive one, since the sellers are small
shareholders as described above. That is, the equilibrium price P must be unique
and:
P 7=(Po-lAP)+(1-T)P
where r is the probability of success of the takeover bid, perceived by small share-
holders. In other words, the share price at time 1 must be set at a level such that
each small shareholder is indifferent between selling the share right now or wait for
the possibility of free riding. Notice that in this pricing mechanism the small investor
(buyer) does not lose. His evaluation of the stock should be the same as P1.
The probability r is endogenous to the model. It actually depends on the observed
transaction volume, i.e. r = r(y). The reason is that y conveys new information about
the number of arbitragers in position and therefore how many shares will be tendered
'*One may ask the question why the total demand of the arbitrager is exogenous, i.e., not re-
sponsive to the trading price. The implicit assumption is that the total number of the arbitrager
is limited so that there is no over-entry of arbitragers and no concern of negative ez ante arbitrage
profit. Therefore, as long as an arbitrager is not tied up in his current project, he is willing to place
an order.
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in the coming tendering game. Note that there is another probability of success of
the takeover, r", which is calculated by an arbitrager when he places his order. As
argued before, " > r. This will be shown later.
After the trading session is closed, the arbitrager gets his shares and observes the
transaction volume y. Now that he becomes a large shareholder, he has to make
a decision regarding the portion of his shares to be tendered. Let the ratio of the
portion be y E [0,1]. For hhn, an optimal -y should strike a balance between two
opposing forces. When -y is close to 0, it is highly likely that he may become the
person who tenders too few shares and the whole takeover fails. In this case, a loss
will be incurred (which is Po - P ). When, to the contrary, y is close to 1, it is likely
that some of his tendered shares will not actually be needed for the raider to take
control. Therefore, he should have tendered less so that he could get Po + AP per
share for these retained shares. Of course the optimal y depends on the arbitrager's
belief on n and his belief on other arbitragers' y. In a symmetric equilibrium, all
arbitragers tender the same portion y.
3. Arbitrage and the Success of the Takeover
The tendering game, which follows the trading session at time 1, is played among
the arbitragers. Small shareholders stay out of the picture, since in order to free ride,
the remaining small shareholders always decide not to tender their shares (by the
Grossman-Hart argument). After obtaining the shares, the arbitrager also observes
the transaction volume y of the trading session. From y, he updates his belief about
n, the total number of arbitragers. Based on this and the belief on the ratios by which
other arbitragers decide to tender their shares, the arbitrager decides how many of his
total shares should be tendered. At a symmetric equilibrium, all arbitragers decide
to tender the same portion of acquired shares. Consequently, the probability that the
takeover is successful is determined.
In the following subsection, the posterior probabilities that the takeover is suc-
cessful are derived. As was argued before, there are two types of these probabilities:
one for the small shareholder and one for the arbitrager. Then the decision of the
arbitrager is analyzed. Subsequently, the existence and properties of the equilibrium
are established. The equilibrium concept used throughout is that of the Symmetric
Bayesian Equilibrium (SBE). In the last subsection, the focus is on the effects of
changes of various factors on the success rate of the takeover bid.
Let A; be the i'th arbitrager who considers tendering y; portion of his total shares.
A, believes that all other A's tender a portion y of their shares
17.
3.1 The Posterior Probabilities of Success of the Takeover
After observing the transaction volume of the trading session, each arbitrager
updates his belief as to how many arbitragers are actually in the takeover game. An
arbitrager's calculated probability is different from that of a small shareholder.
Let r*; be the posterior probability of success of the takeover bid calculated by
the arbitrager A; conditional on the observation of y. Since no small shareholders are
expected to tender, when y < 0.5, r*; = 0. The following derivation assumes y > 0.5.
In this case,
Tai=Tr";(y, y:, a) = Prob [-(n - 1)6 + -y;6 >0.5 1y - o ]
= Prob [ n- 1 20.5 'Y I-f
05 7
where y - 6 is his observation of the total transaction volume excluding his own.
Clearly, A, needs to work out the conditional probability distribution of the number
of arbitragers other than himself. Let d (.) denote probability density, then
d(n-1=s y - 6 ) =d(n1=s,w-f 
( n- 1)a=y-)
d (w + (n - 1) = y - )
"Equivalently, one can assume that A, believes that A, tenders y. This seemingly more general
assumption does not change the following derivation at all, since all that matters is the sum of the
shares tendered by other arbitragers. In other words, y in the formal assumption can be regarded
as the average portion of shares tendered.
13 14




where, d(.) indicates probability density.
Under the assumption that, ex ante, n and w are independent, it follows18
d (n -1 = s, w = y - (s +1)6) = g(s4+ 1)f(y - (s + 1)6)
and
d [w + (n -1)6= y -6] = + 1)f[y - (t + 1)6]dt
= g(t)f(y - to)dt
Therefore, we have
=Pr ~-1 0 5 y- :Y
= Prob[ n -1 2 |y f -6J= g(s+1)f[y-6-s]ds
and consequently,
Y. ,t9(s+1)f[y-6-s6Jds
fib g(t)f(y - to)dt
fp 71 g(s)f(y - so)ds
f 1fg(t)f(y -to)dt
As for a small shareholder and the raider, there is no basis for the belief that
there is at least one arbitrager in the game. This is because they only observe the
transaction volume y, which may solely come from small traders. If one repeats the
above calculation, then the posterior probability of success of the takeover (conditional
on y) for both the small shareholder and the raider, r, is
ft g2(s)f(y - s)ds
r = ' ' (3.2)
foi g(t)f(y - t6)dt
'To be rigorous, the following derivation should start with the event "{ a - e < n - 1 <8 +e1I|
y- a - es < w + (n -1)J < y -
6 
+ f2 )" before taking limits with both el and e2 going to zero. It
can be verified that this rigorous approach will yield exactly the same results, since all the density
functions are smooth. Therefore, for ease of exposition, the intuitive approach is presented here.
It is clear by comparing (3.1) and (3.2), that
T° ; >T.
This verifies the afore-mentioned intuition behind the trade between the small
shareholder and the arbitrager.
3.2 An arbitrager's Tendering Decision
For arbitrager A;, if the takeover proves to be successful, the averaged price per
share is PTy, + (Po + AP)(1 - -y;); if the takeover fails, the price is Po. Clearly, his
problem is
SP;*(y, b)= 6 MAX,, [PTY; + (Po + AP)(1 - -y,)] r + Po(1 - r,)
or
6P (y,5) = MAX, 6 [AP -- y(Po+AP-PT)] r",+Po
where y; E [0, 1] and T, is the probability of success of the takeover.
Define
P,; = [AP - 'y(Po + AP - PT)]T (3.3)
Then A; is actually maximizing PT;. In P,, Ta; is A;'s inferred probability that
the takeover is going to be successful.
From (3.3) the first order derivative of P, is
T' (P + AP -PT)T
0
, ±[AP - y(P0 ±AP -PT)]
As it stands, the above expression makes intuitive sense. For an increase in y;,
the first term represents the loss incurred by missed opportunity of free riding. For
the same increase in -y, the second term stands for the marginal gain in payoff due
to a marginal increase in the probability that the takeover is successful. Rearranging
terms, one has
PPTo+_ oP)_P-





Po+ AP - PT
'i; = q;(y, y,7 ,-)
and
i = c- 7i - q;(y,y,7,,6) (3.4)
Equation (3.4) is a crucial one in characterizing the behavior of the arbitragers.
Later, it will be utilized periodically. Also note that c > 1, since by assumption:
0< P+AP-PTP <©AP
From (3.1), the partial derivative of r"; with respect to 7; is:
-r; 1 9( - )f(y - I + 2L.o,5)
87; 7 9fg(t)f(y - to)dt
and so q; is actually
f19(s)f(y - so)ds
q(y,7,7;, 6) = 7 g( ,s)f(y -_+ 16) (3.5)
The optimal 7 of A; is a reaction to other arbitragers' y. The reaction function
7e = 7(7) is such that:
'I;(y,7,0,) <0 if 7(7) = 0
(y, 7, 7,-) = 0 if 0 < 7i(7) < 1
'';(y,7,1, 6) >0 if 7;(7) = I
Apparently, the function q; plays a crucial role in shaping the reaction function
and, later, the equilibrium. The intuition behind q; is that it is inversely related to
the possibility that A;'s tendering is pivotal to the success of the takeover. Notice
that q; and r" are transformations of each other. Actually, in the case that q(.) is
continuous, it is not difficult to see that
r*e(y,7, 7i,6) = e-. , ild *
The following lemma gives some properties of the function q,. They are needed in
order to characterize the properties of the reaction function 7; = 7y(y, 7,6).
Lemma 1 Under assumption 1,
- > 0 -- > 0
Proof: See Appendix II.
The proof of the above lemma is purely technical and thus omitted here. The ex-
planation of this lemma is that when the transaction volume increases, an arbitrager's
tendering is less likely to be pivotal; also when an arbitrager tenders more and more
shares, it is less and less likely that his tendering is pivotal. With this lemma, the
properties of the reaction function are simple and intuitive.
Proposition 1 The reaction function 7= 7(y, 7,6) is unique and non-increasing
in y. Furthermore, define y,: max (0.5, yj : ';(yj,7,1,6a) = 0) andgj: min {1, ya :
%P (y2,7', 0, 6) = 0 }. Then,
0<7,<1, when y <y<y
7,0, Yy >
Proof: Given the lemma, 8*' = - < 0 ; also 12' '' = -1 -a, < 0.
Referring to the definition of , if y , V7; < 1,
'yP(1,7, 7,6) > ',(g,-Y1,6) = 0
Recall that 'P shares its sign with e- . Therefore, the best reaction to any y is
;= 1 when y < 1.
The proof for the other cases are similar, and hence omitted here.
As for the uniqueness and non-increasingness of 7, in y, it suffices to consider the
case y < y < 3. In this case, ' < y < y, ;(y,7,1,6) < 0 < 9,(y,7,0, 6). Coupled
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with the fact that 'P; is strictly decreasing in -y, the existence and uniqueness of y; is
guaranteed, and
9'i(y,y,7;(y,'Y,6),6) = 0
Taking partial derivatives with respect to y for all terms in (3.6):
a q; 89, 89,8-y, =
-y- -y -- -y-=y
gives





The above characterization of the reaction function is very intuitive. All it says is
that given the portion of tendered shares for other arbitragers, the higher the level of
transaction volume, the more arbitragers will be inferred by A;, and therefore fewer
shares will be tendered by him in order for him to take the opportunity to free ride.
3.3 The Existence and Properties of Symmetric Equilibria of the Ten-
dering Game
At a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium (SBE), it must be true that y,(-y) = y. In
search for such equilibria, define f(y,-y, 6) = ',(y,y, y,,6). As will be seen, ' is
crucial in determining the existence of the symmetric equilibrium of the tendering
game. To be specific,
f_ g(s)f(y - so)ds
(((y,--,
6) =c 7 7 9 I)f(y - 7+ 16)
And finally, define 7* = r";(y,y,y,6), i.e.
ff g(s)f(y - sods
4 g(t)f(y - t)dt (3.10)
The following lemma is needed in the proof of Proposition 2 which characterizes
the SBE of the game. Again, the proof of this lemma is too technical to warrant
presentation in the main text.








Proof: See Appendix III.'
In the above lemma, g > 0 states that as the tendering portion goes up, the
chance of each of them being pivotal goes down. This is perfectly intuitive - the
same is true with a > 0: when all arbitragers tender more shares, the probabilities
of success of the takeover should go up. Thus, a > 0 and ogj > 0. However, caution
should be exercised when interpreting the inequalities a > 0 and og > 0, because
the implicit condition behind them is that y is held constant. In fact, y may decrease
when y increases, as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Given any y, there exists a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium 7 =
y(y), which is non-increasing in y 19. In other words, when the transaction vol-
ume goes up, the arbitrager tends to free ride. Furthermore, define y: Mar{ y,
"There exist other symmetric Bayesian equilibria, in which y; =y < . This is easy to see,
since if all other arbitrager tender y < , then even if arbitrager i tenders all of his shares, the
number of shares tendered will be 6 + (n - 1)y7< 6 + ( -1)a_- < + 0.5 - a = O.5. Thus, the
f g(s)f(y - so)ds -9 ,- q(y, 7,
I(") y-0--)
where q(y, y,6) is defined as






0 <y7<1, *(y,7,6)=O, when y >E.-
Proof: Notice that from the equation:
4 9(t)f(y1 - to)dt
c-1- y( )/(y -0.5) 0
it is clear that yi > 0.5 (since c > 1) and so y> 0.5. By the definition given by (3.8)
%(y,7,6) = c-- 7-q(y,y, 6)
and recall that ' shares sign with -p and
89
-= -q' <0
87 = F -1- q,< 0
Also notice that 'P(y, 0,6) = c > 0. When y goes from 0 to 1, 'P should travel
from c to *(y,1,6) in a strictly decreasing fashion. If I(y,1,6) < 0, then there is a
unique equilibrating 7 to make 'P(y,7,6) = 0; no other y qualifies as an equilibrium.
If 9(y,1,6) > 0, then 7= 1 is the equilibrium, since in this case all arbitragers want
to tender more, but 7 = 1 is the upper limit. In this case, no 7 < 1 can be another
equilibrium. Thus, we have the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
As for the non-increasingness of the equilibrium, take partial derivatives with




outcome of the game is always the same, that is, the takeover fails. Therefore, arbitrager i might
as well tender the same proportion 7. Of course, such equilibria are highly unrealistic and can be
easily ruled out. A rational arbitrager would never tender as low as the above 7, since such 7 can
only lead to the failure of the takeover which is not in the interest of the arbitragers at all. I owe
this point to Bart Lipman of the Queen's University.
and therefore:
87 - ' <0
y 1+qf,
Q.E.D.
3.4 The Determination of Success of the Takeover Bid
As illustrated in the last subsection, the arbitrager's decision of how many shares
to tender is a result of balancing two opposite forces: the tendency to-tender more
in order to increase the probability of success of the takeover versus the tendency to
tender less in order to get more private return by free riding. Likewise, any changes in
the observed transaction volume y will have two opposite gross effects on the predicted
probability of success of the takeover. On the one hand, when y increases, more
arbitragers are likely to be in position and this promises a greater chance of success
of the takeover. On the other hand, when y increases, each arbitrager's tendering
is less pivotal to the success of the takeover; the arbitrager reacts by tendering less.
In general, the net effect of an increase in the observed transaction amount on the
probability of success of the takeover can be either positive or negative.
To express the above idea clearly, notice that r = r(y, 7) and therefore
dr Or +Ordy
dy y+87dy
As was shown in lemma 2, the direct effect of an increase in y on r, g, is positive,
and so is that of an increase in 7. From proposition 2, an increase in y will decrease
7. Therefore the net effect of an increase in y on T cannot be easily determined.
One obvious and very important case is when y < y. In this case, by proposition
2, there is no indirect effect on T, since 7 is always equal to 1. This is important
because it seems to be the most likely situation. In reality, it is not common to see
arbitragers trying to free ride.
The following proposition answers the question of whether a higher level of trans-
action volume in the trading session bodes for a high probability of success of the
takeover.
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Proposition 3 Within the range y < V, an increase in y will increase the predicted
probabilities of success of the takeover bid; it will also increase the post-announcement
share price. The probabilities are calculated by the arbitrager and by the raider or
small shareholder. When y > y, the effect of an increase in y on the probabilities can
be either increasing or decreasing. In other words,
di- di-* dP1- >0, --- >0, and --- >0, for y <dy dy dy
where P is the trading price of trading session.
Proof: (trivial, omitted)
It is interesting to note that y in the last two propositions is actually a function
of PT, since c in (4-8) is a function of Pr. To be specific, recall that the definition of
y, when it is less than 1, is actually:
f gfdt
c-i- g(. ))f(y - 0.5) 0
By lemma 2, it is easy to see that 9jjf 5 05) is increasing in y. Therefore, it
is clear that an increase in c caused by an increase in PT (see the proof of the next
proposition for this point) will not decrease y. Hence,
Corollary 1 Any increase in the tender offer price PT makes it more likely that an
increase in the observed transaction volume y bodes an increased probability of success
of the takeover bid. In other words, if P.> P2, then d2 > 0 implies h' > 0, and
a y > 0 implies '> 0. 1
Unlike the change in the observed transaction volume, an increase in the bid-
ding price has an unambiguous positive effect on the probability of success of the
takeover. This is very intuitive, since an increase in the tender offer will definitely
lure arbitragers away from free riding.
Proposition 4 At any level of the observed transaction volume y, the higher the
bidding price, the higher the predicted probabilities of success of the takeover. In
other words,
di- dr*"
->;2 0 and > 0
dPT dPT
Proof: First of all, by the definition of c,
dc AP
dPT- (Po +AP-PT)2
In other words, an increase in P will have the same effect as an increase in c.
To the raider and small shareholders, the probability of takeover conditional on y
is
f. g(s)f(y - s6)ds
T fo g(t)f(y - to)dt
(3.10)
Therefore
dr p.g(og) f(y - T) &(.2TT F 7T di,(3.12)
dPT fo g(t)f(y - 6t) dPT
As for a, it is either equal to0, when y < y, or from the equilibrium condition
c- y-9(y,y, 6 ) =0
we have
dPT i+q;y(y,'y,6)> 0
Therefore it is true that dom.> 0.
The same procedure carries over to the proof of d- > 0, and is omitted here.
1 Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 implies that a higher bidding price will trigger a bigger price jump in
the post-announcement trading session, since the price jump is positively dependent
on the probability of success of the takeover. Therefore the following corollary must
be true.
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Corollary 2 At any level of the observed transaction volume, the higher the bidding




As a matter of fact, the proposition 4 also implies that a higher takeover bid
will make the ex ante probability of success of the takeover higher. That is, without
observing the transaction volume, the raider can confidently increase the success
rate of his takeover bid by offering a higher bid. For the raider, this is really a
very favorable situation which is caused by the participation of the arbitragers. The
reason is that without these arbitragers, the situation becomes the one described by
Grossman and Hart (1980). In their model, any increase in the bidding price is useless
in improving the chance of takeover, unless the bidding price is already high enough
so that the success rate of the takeover is 100%. But in such a bid, there is no surplus
left for the raider. In short, without arbitragers, the success rate is either 0 or 1. In
either case, the raider gets zero gross surplus and cannot recover his takeover cost.
Corollary 3 Let T be the ex ante probability of success of the takeover bid, calculated
by the raider before the beginning of the trading session (i.e. unconditional on y), then
4>0.
Proof: Let f,(.) be the distribution of the transaction volume, and r, as before, is
the probability of takeover conditional on y. Clearly,
T = f r(t, PT)f,(t)dt
and therefore by proposition 4,
=T ' Br(t, Pr.)f,(t)dt > 0
dP T_ o OPT
SQ.E.D.
4. The Raider's Optimal Bidding Strategy
In this section, the decision of a rational corporate raider is studied. Specifically,
the focus is on the the optimal bidding price of the raider. Obviously, in making this
decision, the raider should take the existence of the arbitrager into account. The basic
model above can be regarded as a game which is subsequent to the raider's decision.
In his search for the optimal bidding price, the raider faces a fundamental trade-
off between the success rate of the takeover and the surplus from the raid. That is,
when the raider offers a high tender offer price, the success rate of the takeover will
be relatively high; however, at such a bidding price, the surplus per share is also
relatively small. A rational raider would strike a balance between these two forces.
The raider maximizes his expected net profit by choosing a best bidding price.
With the assumption that the raider is risk-neutral and that there is no cost to the
bidding process (alternatively, all costs are sunk), his problem is
MAX p,. (Po + AP - Pr )E[N(Pr)] (4.1)
where Po + AP - PT is the surplus per share to the raider from a successful raid.
E[N(Pr)] is the expected number of tendered shares, conditional on the event that it
is greater than 50%. For a given transaction volume y, the number of shares tendered
by each arbitrager is Jy(y). Let t be the number of arbitragers; then the total shares




Thus, the expected number of shares tendered given y is
f 4 s&-y(y)g(s)f(y - Js)ds
E[nr(y)] =
fog (s)f(y - 6s)ds
and the ex ante expectation of the total number of shares tendered (unconditional on
y) is
f a s67(y)g(s)f(y - 6s)ds
E[N(Pr)] = E[nr(y)]f,(y)dy = f,(y)dy
o g(s)f(y - Js)ds
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But, as was derived above
fs(y) = g(t)f(y - 6t)dt
therefore
E[N(PT)J]= jIdyJ s6y(y)g(s)f(y - s)ds (4.2)
and notice that in (4.2) 7(y) is also a function of PT.
In summary, in a conditional tender offer, the raider chooses the optimal bidding
price by considering:
MAXPr (Po + AP - PT) jdy f sy(y)g(s)f(y - 6s)ds (4.3)
One of the important questions of concern to the shareholder is: would an increase
in the value improvement AP make the raider bid a higher price for the control of the
firm? Or, is the bidding price PT positively related to the value improvement that
a raider can bring to the firm? The answer to this question is important, because
if a high value-improver bids lower than a low value-improver, then it is possible
that under certain circumstances, the firm may end up in the hands of the low value
improver.
The above issue is also of great interest to students of the contest for corporate
control. Typically, empirical researchers in corporate finance use the bidding price
to measure the potential improvement that the raider can bring to the firm. The
reason seems to be that there are no better and easier proxies for this incremental in
share price20. Therefore, if the tender offer price by an optimizing raider is not posi-
tively correlated with the value improvement, then the common practice in empirical
research is problematic.
Fortunately, the undesirable situation where an increase in AP reduces PT does
not happen. As a matter of fact, in the current set-up where the value-improvement
is commonly known, the raider's optimal pricing strategy is very simple.
"The difficulty associated with using the post-takeover share price appears to be that it has to
rely heavily on the theory of efficient capital markets.
Proposition 5 In a conditional tender offer, the higher the value improvement that
the rmider is able to bring to the firm, the higher the raider's bidding price. Specifically,
the takeover premium offered by the raider, PT - Po, is proportional to the value
improvement AP, i.e.,
PT -Po = aAP
where, 0 < a < 1 and it is independent of AP. Moreover, the higher the value
improvement, the higher the raider's expected profit from the takeover attempt.
Proof: From (4.1), the expected profit to the raider when he offers a bidding price
of PT is




In general, given LAP and P0, a is an one-to-one function of PT. Therefore, the raider's
choice of PT can be regarded as that of a. This way, the raider's profit is
AP(1 - a)E[N(a)] (4.4)
Obviously, in order to prove the assertions about the raider's optimal choice of PT,
one needs only to prove that in the above expression, the term E[N(a)] is independent
of AP. Indeed, this is true. To see why, by (4.2)
E[N] = j dyJr soy(y)9(s)f(y - Ss)ds (4.2)
in which the only place AY can possibly play a role is -7(y), which is the equilibrium
tendering portion by the arbitrager. But from the arbitrager's problem described in
the last section, -y(y) is the arbitrager's rational choice by comparing the benefit and
cost of tendering. The benefit of tendering comes from the increased probability of
success of the takeover:
OraBT = 6 [7(PT - Po) + (1 -y)iP ] (4.5)
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which says that for a unit of increase in the probability of takeover, the benefit comes
from the realization of the tender offer and the takeover. -y is the tendered portion
which gets a boost in value from Po to PT; 1 - -y is the retained part whose value
increases from P0 to Po + AP. The cost of tendering is the lost opportunity of free
riding:
BF =or*(Po+ AP -PT) (4.6)
which says that when the takeover proves to be a success the untendered share gets
Po + AP, instead of PT had it been tendered.
y(y) is chosen so that BT is equal to Bp (y(y) is 1 when (4.5) is always larger
than (4.6) ). By Comparing (4.5) with (4.6), it is clear that this decision is solely
dependent on a.
Alternatively, from (3.8), y(y) is determined by
c - - (Y) > 0
( if for all 7 5 1it is > 0, then y(y) = 1) where c = ,, =- Therefore, one
can also see that y(y) is independent of AP.
Thus, the first parts of the proposition are proved. As for the last part, it is
obvious from (4.2). Q.E.D.
This proposition actually provides a rule of dividing the takeover surplus between
the raider and other parties (the incumbent small shareholder and the arbitrager). It
says that the profit of the takeover to the raider is a fixed proportion of the total value
improvement that he brings to the firm, while small shareholders and the arbitrager
take the rest of the profit.
This division of the surplus of takeover has a certain implication for the efficiency
of the market of corporate control. One can regard the raider as a producer of the
value improvement of the firm. A variable cost of this production is the bidding price
he has to pay in order to obtain the control of the firm. Assuming that the cost of the
search for the value improvement is either fixed or sunk, then the raider would always
want to implement as much value improvement as possible. From the shareholder's
point of view, this scenario is ideal. Therefore, it seems that with the participation
of the arbitrager, the market of corporate control is efficient.
5. Conclusions and Implications
In summary, there are three major conclusions in this paper. First, it is demon-
strated that arbitragers can enhance the efficiency of corporate control. Their par-
ticipation in the contest for corporate control makes otherwise impossible takeover
attempts successful. Second, the involvement of the arbitrager explains very well
the widely observed stock market movements during the process of the takeover, in-
cluding the dramatic rise in share price and in transaction volume. It predicts that
in most cases, a high transaction volume is associated with a high success rate, as
well as with a high post-announcement trading price. Also, the higher the bidding
price, the higher the success rate and the bigger the jump in share price. Finally,
the existence of the arbitrager implies that in the tender offer, the shareholder can
always expect to get a fixed portion of the total value improvement by the raider.
This surprisingly simple division rule of the takeover surplus has a lot of implications
for related empirical research and indicates that the market for corporate control may
be efficient.
A direct implication of these conclusions concerns public opinion about the arbi-
trager. Criticisms are occasionally launched by the general public against arbitragers
on the basis that they are extremely greedy and getting unfairly high profit. However,
what most people do not realize is that the arbitrager can contribute to the increase
in the value of publicly traded firms.
A much less obvious implication of this paper applies to the current privatization
movement in the post-socialist economies. In these economies, due to decades of
socialism, wealth distribution is very even. Therefore, the privatization process will
almost for sure generate a very diffused ownership structure for the privatized firm.
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This is regarded as very undesirable in terms of corporate control and efficiency (see
Kornai (1990)). One popular solution is the creation of "holding companies" (for
example, Lipton and Sachs (1990) and Blanchard, et cetera (1990) ). However, the
scheme of "holding companies" has potential problems. Economically, the issue of
how to discipline and control the management of these "holding companies" is left
open. Politically, these "holding companies" may easily become (or be regarded as)
the same entities as the old economic ministries under the old regimes. such proposals
to win wide-spread support from the general public.
The conclusions in this paper suggest that financial markets with active arbi-
tragers will be very important in mitigating this problem of privatization, since a few
arbitragers in the stock market, who are very mobile in transferring from one firm
to another, are sufficient to discipline the management of a lot of firms21. In other
words, one can imagine that only a very few genuinely profit seeking large investors
as arbitragers are enough to enhance the efficiency of almost all diffusely owned firms.
Appendix I. Justifications of 'f-eating n as a Real Number
In the text of the paper, the random number of arbitragers n is treated as a real number
and its distribution g(.) is regarded as a continuous and smooth function. Although the
obvious reason for doing so is technical convenience, there do exist conceptual justifications
for this.
The following is an alternative framework for the model. It will be argued that this
model will yield the same equilibria, under certain conditions.
Let n only take integer values. Assume that when an arbitrager A; puts an demand
of a shares of the target firm, his broker may not be able to come up with exactly the
"After the privatization, the most likely and, perhaps, appropriate corporate raiders are the
former management and bureaucrats since they know the best about the firm.
amount of shares 6. Instead, there is a slight discrepancy between what is demanded and
what is obtained. Let the obtained amount of shares be 6,. E ante, 5; follows distribution
fj(.), which is supported by an interval [6 - e, a + e]. These distributions of the size of the
arbitragers are independent and identical. Finally, each arbitrager only observes his own
realization of 6,, and cannot update his belief of other arbitragers' 6,.
Let z be the total shares controlled in the hands of arbitragers. In the current set-up,
x becomes a real number. Let the ex ante distribution of z be g,(.). Assume that all other
arbitragers tender y portion of their shares, then, using the same notation as before,
fi a 9(a + 6 t)f/(y - 5 - s)ds
-rei = Prob{yi;+ (x - 5;)'Y > 0.5|1 y - b'i} = '_',_+3)( g-tdJf' g=(t + 6,)f(y - 6i - t)dt
f _2.g,,(s)f(y - s)ds
fJgd(t)f(y - t)dt
The reaction function of Ai is:
l'Y = 7i(y,'Y, ,)
In general, this reaction function depends on the realization of 6,. However, if e is small
enough, the following is a good approximation:
7; = 'y;(yj,y, 6;) e'y(,y6
And the whole game can be approximated by the game where 6. = 6 for all i. But when
6, = 6, n = I becomes a real number and we are back to the original game analyzed before.
Alternatively, if the distribution function g(.) is highly concentrated around S, = 8  and
that it is costly to calculate the full schedule 7, = 'y(., ., 6,) and if Ai has limited calculation
capacity to adjust his reaction function between when 6; is realized and the tender offer is
due, then it is worthwhile for an arbitrager to play the game as if his 6i is always equal to
6. Again, the game is degenerated to the original one where n is a real number.
The bottom line is that treating n as a real number can be either regarded as an
approximation to the normal case where n is an integer or, alternatively, can be justified
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when all players of the game experience a certain level of bounded rationality.
Appendix II. Proof of Lemma 1:
A) Three Useful Inequalities
Before proving the lemma, let us establish the following facts: under the current as-
sumptions of the model, for any a < b,
g
2 (a) + g'(a) g(t)dt > 0
9(a)/g'f - g'(a)jgf < 0
and
f(a)/gf' - f'(a)jgf >0
(where f(t) refers to f(y - St) )





By the concavity of g(.) and (a-6),
g(a)fg'f - 9'(a)jgf < g'(a) ((a) f - jgf) < 0
If g'(a) > 0, then without losing generality, let to be such that g'(to) = 0, when g'(b) < 0
and to = b when g'(b) > 0. Clearly
g(a) g'f - g'(a) /gf g(a,) g'f - g'(a) jogf (a - 7)
since both terms on the left-hand-side made concessions to their counterparts in the right-
hand-side.
By the concavity of g(.) and (a-7),
g(a)tj g'f - g'(a) gt0 9f < g'(a) (g(a) f - jogf) < 0
since, now that g'(t) > 0, for all a < t < to, which implies g(a) > g(t), one has
(a) f -jgf < 0
Therefore in all cases, (a-2) should hold. The proof of (a-3) is almost the same as (a-2),
except that f(.) actually is f(y - at) which makes the signs reversed. The proof of (a-3) is
omitted to save space.
B) Proof of g20:
Recall that
,7j, 6)=9(s)f(y - so)da
q; (y,1,'+;',5) = y ) y- +s
For notational ease, define
0.5 -y -- y
67 -7
and b = 5. In addition, write g(s) as g, f(y - 6s) as f, g(s)f(y - bs) as h and fa.g(t)f(y -











Putting (a-4) and (a-5) together, one gets (a-1), since








As for (a-2), if g'(a) < 0, then g'(t) < 0 for all t > a which implies that g(a) > g(t) for
all t > a. So
ay B
( -8)





where B = h2(a) and
A = ( g()f()+ gJf' ) g(a)f(a) - (J f) g(a)f'(a)
= h(a)h(b) +g(a) (f(a)jgf' - 1'(a)Jgf ) > h(a)h(b) > 0
The last but one step in the above derivations is due to (a-3).
Therefore t > 0
C) Proof of > 0
Oq, -B
where B is the same as the one in (a-8), while
C = ( -h 2 (a) _-h'(a)Jh) Oa= h2 (a) + h'(a) f h
By assumption 1, h is concave. Therefore applying (a-1), C > 0, which gives
>0
Appendix III. Proof of Lemma 2:
A) Proof of a > 0 and 1 >0
The validity of ( > 0 is actually already established by the results of lemma 1
> 0; since the difference between q, and q lies between the evaluation of -y;, which is
immaterial to the last inequality.
As for the second inequality, from the definition of (4-0),
8q q -h2(a) - h'(a) f h8 a q h2(a)+ 1-'(a) f h 0.5
&Y -'r 'y h2(a) &y -'y +- h
2
(a) Jr2
Therefore by (a-1) > 0.
B) Proof of >0 and J>0
The second inequality is obvious, since
Or -h(a) 8a h(a) 0.5
= foh)y = (fh)272> 0
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As for the first one, from (4-2),
Or (j()tfagf') foil - (}h(j)+f 0 gf')fah
ay (f~h)2
So, in order to prove ( > 0, one wants to establish
( h()4jf' ) fh - ( h( )+.9f')a h >0
But, since
It will suffice, if
h{a) h - h()h>0
fitjgi' - fhjgi' >0
which will be true if
ffof
is an increasing function. Indeed, for $9(t),
= -gf'(t) f, gf + gf(t) f gf' >0
(f4 h)2
because of (a-3).
Therefore ( > 0 is true.
C) Proof ofg>0 and >0
Since the only difference between r and r" lies in the lower bound of the integration
of denominators, i.e. f0 h v.s. flh, it is very easy to see that the proof in part B) can be
repeated here without any difficulty. Therefore the actual proof is omitted to save space.
Appendix IV. Proof of Lemma S
A) Proof that 8g > 0
Now that
4j,.g(s-v)f(ti-sS)ds
q =7- g(v, 15-vOf (y - 0 )
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then 8 9 ,-f.u'ff I9a + fa.9g'f I.
cv( 911. )2
it suffice to prove that
-Jo'f of l. +- J! g'f10>0
which is true, indeed, by (a-2).
B) Proof that <  0
This is true when y < V. When the opposite is true, from
c - ' - q(y,7,6) = 0
one gets
dv1 -q',
from the result of the last part of this appendix.
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